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I.

INTRODUCTION
With the introduction of the automobile came a marked increase in complaints

'

and tension between insureds and their insurance companies. As a result, a significant
development in insurance law is that insurers may be held liable in tort for bad faith
performance of their duties to insureds. The law of bad faith contemplates that a special
relationship exists between insurance companies and their insured^.^ Recognizing the
unique peculiarities of the insurance environment, courts have fashioned the tort of bad
faith as a way of regulating the insurer-insured relationship. The underlying premise of
the law of bad faith is that insurers owe their insureds a duty of good faith and fair
dealing.3 Consequently, an insurer who refuses to deal fairly with its insured, or fails to
conduct its affairs in good faith may be subject to compensatory and punitive damages
upon a finding of bad faith.
Bad faith insurance actions arise in two contexts: 1) that of third-party claims, in
which the insured is seeking defense and indemnification from liability to a third party,"
and 2) first-party claims, in which the insured is seeking indemnification from the insurer
for a loss suffered by the insured personally.' Although the law of bad faith has received
wide recognition and acceptance, the term "bad faith" lacks a single, coherent definition,
meaning different things in different contexts!

'

Daniel S. Bopp, Tort and Contract in Bod Faith Cases: Is the Honeymoon Over? 59 Def. Couns. 1.524
(1 992).
' Id.
' Id.
'Seee.g., Lujanv. Gonzales, 84 N.M. 229,501 P.2d 673 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 219,501 P.2d
663 (1 972).
'See United Nuclear Corp. v Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 480,485,709 P.2d 649,654 (1985).
See Ambassador Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine, 102 N . M . 28,30,690 P.2d 1022 (1984)wew
Mexico does not adhere to a single definition of bad faith).

The purpose of this paper is to put the term "bad faith" into context by explaining

,n.

the development and application of the law of bad faith in New Mexico.
11.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INSURANCE BAD FAITH: THE
IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
Before the creation of the bad faith action, it was not unusual for insurers to

disregard the interests of their policyholders by refusing to settle third-party claims or pay
the proceeds on first-party claims.'

Consumers who tried to challenge abusive insurance

practices were limited to seeking contractual remedies which allowed them to recover
only the amount of the benefits due under the policy.' Contractual remedies were often
inadequate in the context of insurance and faulted because they did nothing to control
unscrupulous insurance practices?
With the invention of the automobile, problems in insurance claim settlement
practices grew steadily worse.I0 As the number of automobiles increased, so did the
number of motor vehicle accidents and related insurance c1aims.l' Consequently, courts
began to encounter a proliferation of disputes concerning the insurer's alleged failure to
Most of the complaints arose in the third-party context
meet contract expe~tations.'~
where insurers were alleged to have engaged in abusive claim settlement practices.'"~
result, courts began to reconsider the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
found in all contracts in an attempt to regulate the insurer-insured relation~hi~.'~

7

Stephen S. Ashley, Bad Faith Actions: Liability and Damages, 2* Edition, 1-1 (West, 1997).

'Id.

Robert H. Jerry, 11, Understanding Insurance Law 43,2nd Edition., 155 (Matthew Bender, 1996).
"Ashley, supra, 1-2.
" Id.

a

A. The Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
,f--

Insurance policies are contracts between the insurer and the insured. The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that every contract imposes upon each party a
duty of good faith and fair dealing in performance and enforcement of the contract.15
Thus, the implied duty of good faith requires that neither party do anything that will
injure the other's right to receive the benefit of their agreement.I6
Parties to an insurance contract share a special contractual relationship. This
relationship arises out of the parties' perceived unequal bargaining power and the
personal nature of the insurance relationship, which potentially allows an unsc~pulous
insurer to take advantage of its insured." As one commentator has stated, "An insurance
contract is the bringing together of a vulnerable seeker of protection and a financially
hyper-fortified institution."18 The insured-insurer relationship is also characterized by
elements of public interest, adhesion and fiduciary re~ponsibility.'~Thus, the implied
contractual duty of good faith requires the insurer to make an honest, intelligent, and fair
weighing of the probabilities of liability; to make a diligent effort to ascertain the facts
upon which only an intelligent and good faith judgment may be predicated; and to
investigate claim^.'^
Furthermore, by accepting the terms of their insurance policies, insureds
relinquish the right to control their litigation and to decide whether or not to accept
(Second) of Contracts g 205 (1981).
Douglas R. Richmond, An overview oflnsurance BadFaith Law and Litigation, 25 Seton Hall. L Rev.
74 (1 994).
"id. at 76.
I8
Bopp, supra, at 524 .
l9 Steven W. Shaw, Whor is insurance Bad Faith? 38 AUG Advocate (Idaho) 15 (1995) (citing White v.
Unigard, 1 12 Idaho 94,99,730 P.2d 1014, 1019 (1986)
" Restatement

settlement offers.'' Although such constraints are intended to prevent collusive
settlement agreements, these restrictions often expose policyholders' ~lnerability.~'
For
example, if an insurer unjustifiably refuses to settle a suit against its insured. In this
situation, the insured bears the risk of an excess judgment despite his or her having no
control over the litigation.
The duty of good faith and fair dealing found in insurance contracts often includes
certain fiduciary elements. However, it is not improper for an insurer to give
consideration to its own interests, as long as it gives equal consideration to the welfare of
its policyholder." Consequently, an insurance company's contract to provide insurance
does not in and of itself create a fiduciary relationship. In a true fiduciary relationship,
the agent owes its principal a duty of undivided loyalty, treating the interests of the
n

principal as param0unt.2~Once the insurer acts on behalf of its insured, either within the
course of litigation or in determining whether or not to accept an offer of settlement, a
fiduciary relationship is ~reated.~'
It is the breach of this duty that subjects the insurer to
bad faith remedies.
B. Tort Remedies in Bad Faith Actions
Although the duty of good faith and fair dealing in insurance has connections to
the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing found in other contract situations, it has
developed its own unique characteristics. For example, damages in a breach of contract

lo Ambassador, Ins.

Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine, 102 N . M . 28,690 P.2d 1022 (1984).

" Ashley, supra, 4-26.

" Jeny, 11, supra, at 763,764.
Lujan v. Gonzales, 84 N.M.

220,501, P.2d 673 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 84 N.M.219,501 P.2d 553

(1972).
William Barker, Paul Glad, & Steven Levy, Is an Insurer a Fiduciary to Its Insured? 25 Tort & Ins. L.J.
1,2 (1 989).

24

A.

action are generally limited to those that reflect the contemplation of the parties at the
time the bargain was ~truck.2~
Consequential damages are normally not available in a
contract action since they are limited to the realm of tort law."

Under the law of bad

faith, an insurer's breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing subjects the
insurer to the broader range of tort remedies.28
The primary motivation for recognizing the remedial powers of tort law was the
inadequacy of contract remedies to fully compensate insureds or to deter unscrupulous
Take the example of the insurer who unjustifiably refuses to settle
insurance pra~tices.2~
a claim against its insured. At trial, a judgment is entered against the insured for damages
exceeding the policy limits. Under normal contract principles, the insurer is only liable to
the insured for the amount of the policy limits. However, upon a finding of bad faith, the
insurer is exposed to liability for the excess judgement, the insured's costs and emotional
distress, as well as punitive damages.30

A number of commentators believe courts were too quick to embrace the law of
bad faith." In particular, critics argue that tort remedies are really unnecessary?' If an
insurer unjustifiably fails to settle a third party claim against its insured, potential
exposure to a judgment exceeding policy limits is a foreseeable consequence of the

" Chavez v. Chenoweth, 89 N.M.423,430,553

P.2d 703,710 (Ct. App. 1976).
Richmond, supra, at 76.
Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Failh in First-Party Insurance Tramactions Afler Two Decades,
37 Ariz. L. Rev. 1153 (1995).
28Jerry,11, supra, at 155.
l9 Id.
30 Id.
" See Jeny, 11, supra, at 155.
" Id.
l6

"

insurer's breach?' Under normal contract principles, an insurer would still be liable for
the excess judgment. On the other hand, contract law does nothing to deter unfair
insurance practices, and allows insurers to continue to take advantage of the vulnerable
position of their insureds.j4By viewing the insurance relationship as any other contract,
critics ignore the consequences of this special relationship?'
111.

THIRD-PARTY BAD FAITH
Only liability insurance is truly third-party insurance.36 Liability insurance is

described as third-party insurance because the interests protected by the policy are
strangers who are injured by the insured?' For example, if the policyholder negligently
causes an automobile accident that injures a third party, the third party may bring a claim
against the insured. A policy containing liability coverage promises to indemnify the
insured against the risk of liability he may incur to third parties as a result of his or her
negligence?' Liability coverage can generally be found in both automobile and
A thud-party bad faith action involves a situation where the
homeowners in~urance?~

third party has sued the insured and the insurance company has acted in such a way that
the rights and interests of the insured are adversely affected.
For example, an injured party sues the insured for damages exceeding the limits of
his or her liability policy. Later, the third party offers to settle the claim for an amount

Id.
Id.
" Richmond, supra, 74,76.
' 6 Douglas R. Richmond, Insured's Bad Faith as Shield or Sword: Litigation Relieffor Insurers? 77 Marq.
L. Rev. 41,43 (1993).
"id. at 44.
Is Jeny, 11, supra, at 43.
I9 Ashely, supra, at 1-10.
34

,n.

equal to or less than the limits of the poli~y.4~
The problem with this scenario is that the
insurer has little or no financial motive to accept the third party's offer." By rejecting the
settlement offer, the insurer's only risk for breach of contract is for damages up to its
policy limit^."^ Another problem is that the insurer could force its insured to contribute to
the settlement by threatening to withhold consent to
Troubled by the mounting problems and abuses in insurance litigation, courts
began to recognize that the insurance relationship "carries with it a standard of care that
exists independent of the contract and without reference to the specific terms of the
~ o n t r a c t . 'The
~ implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was slowly transformed
into the law of bad faith as a way to deal with the complexities of the insurance
relationship.
In 1957, the California Court of Appeals, in Brown v. Guarantee Insurance

Company:s applied the principle of good faith and fair dealing to an insurance dispute.

In that case, the court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the insured's complaint
alleging that the insurer "did not exercise good faith" when it refused to settle an
automobile accident damage claim within policy limits. The court reasoned that when an
insurer undertakes to defend the insured and enters into settlement negotiations on the
insured's behalf, the insurer has an obligation to act in good faith.46

'O

Ashley, supra, at 2-2.

" Id.

Id.
" Id. at

2-3.
Douglas R. Richmond, Insured's Bad Failh as Shield or Sword: Litigation Relieffor Insurers? 77 Marq.
L.Rev. 41,43 (1993).
4' 3 9 P.2d 69 (Cat. Ct. App. 1957).
''Id.

r'

A year later, in Crisci v. Secuirry Ins. Co.? the California Supreme Court
.

expanded the law of bad faith when it held'that an insurer's breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing in the settlement context amounted to an independent tort.
Consequently, the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing became the major standard
by which courts considered the obligation of insurers.
A.

To Whom the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing is Owed
To understand the insurer's liability for bad faith in the third party context, it is

important to remember that the insurer's duty of good faith is toward its insured.
Because the insurance relationship is contractual, the insurer does not owe an outside
third party a duty of good faith and fair dealing.48 This distinction was first raised in New
Mexico in the case of Chavez v. C h e n ~ w e t h . ~ ~
In Chavez, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and attempted to
sue the defendant's insurance company for bad faith. The plaintiff argued that the
defendant's insurance agent told her not to seek the assistance of an attorney, reassuring
her that his company would take care of all her medical bills. However, the company
never did. The court held that the duty of good faith and fair dealing applied only within
the contract for in~urance.'~
As a result, the plaintiff in that case did could not bring a
direct action against the insurer for bad faith?' For a third party to pursue a bad faith

" 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
" Chavez v. Chenowerh. 89 N.M.

423.553 P.2d 703 (Ct. ADD.1976).

" 89 N.M. 423,553 ~ . 2 703
d (Ct. pi. 1976).
'O

'I

Id. at 709.
Id.

action, the insured must assign over his or her bad faith action or there must be a "direct
action" statute.'*
B.

The Duty to Defend
Liability insurers owe their insureds a duty of defense and a duty of indemnity.'3

An insurer's breach of either duty can lead to a bad faith claim. Most general liability
policies contain the standard, or similarly worded clause that defines the insurer's duty to
defend: 54
The Company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured
seeking damages on account of such personal injury or property damage, even if
such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent, and may make such investigation and
settlement of any claim or suit.
Thus, the duty to defend is contractual; the insurer agrees to undertake the defense
of covered claims by the language of the policy itself. Duty-to-defend clauses are
liberally construed by the

In the majority of states, the duty to defend is

independent of insurance company's obligation to pay and is much broader than its duty
to inde~nnify.'~Under the terms of the policy, the insurer agrees to defend the
policyholder against meritless or fraudulent suits it will not have to later indemnify."

"See Jeny, 11, supra, at 548-550.
" Lujan v. Gonzales, 84 N.M. 220,233,501, P.2d 673,677 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 219,501 P.2d
553 (1972).
" Stephen J.

'

Smirti, Jr. & Dana M. Workman, Claims Handling andPrelifigafionConsideralions, The
Insurer's Perspeclive, 718 PLYComm 307,323 (1995); Lujan v. Gonzales, 84 N.M. 220,233,501, P.2d
673,677 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 219,501 P.2d 553 (1972)(policy language provides for a duty to
defend "any lawsuit, even groundless, false or fraudulent, against any insured for such damages which are
payable under the terms of this policy").
Ashley, supra, at 4-4.
'6FoundalionReserve Ins. Co. v. Mullenix, 97 N.M. 618,619,642 P.2d 604,605 (1982).
57Lujanv.Gonzales, 84 N.M. 220,501, P.2d 673 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 84N.M. 219,501 P.2d 553
(1972) (under the terms of the insurance policy, insurer had a duty to defend any lawsuit, even if
groundless, false or fraudulent); Smini & Workman, supra at 323(The insurer's duty to indemnify exists as
soon as the contract is formed, however, this duty is conditional: the insurance company does not pay the
proceeds until the insured's liability has been established under the terms of the policy).

"

r',:

As stated by one court:58
The test is not the ultimate proof of the allegations but rather whether sufficient
facts are stated so as to invoke coverage under the policy. The duty to defend
arises not from the probability of recovery but from its possibility, no matter how
remote. Any doubt as to coverage must be resolved in favor of the insured.
C.

When the Duty to Defend Arises
In determining whether in a particular case the insurer has a duty to defend, one

starts with the traditional principle that if the third party's complaint alleges a course of
action for which the policy provides coverage, the insurer must defend.59 However, the
mere fact that the third party's complaint does not allege a claim within policy coverage
.'
does not establish that the insurer has no duty to defend@

To adjust for the fluid and

conclusory nature of modem pleadings, courts have extended the traditional rule to
require the insurer to defend claims that present even potential liability.6' If only one of
several pleaded theories potentially triggers coverage, the insurer is obligated to defend

--

''

George Muhlstock 6; Co. v. American Home Assur. Co., 7 F.3d 93 (7* Cir. 1993); See also Valley
Improvement Ass,. Inc, v. UnitedSfatesFideliry & Guaranty Corp., 129 F.3d 1108 (10th Cu. 1997).
' 9 Ashley, supra, at 4-4; American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Continental Car. Co., 85 N.M. 346,5 12 P.2d
647,677 (1973); See also Lopez v. New Mexico Pub. Sch. Ins. Auth, 117 N.M. 207,209,870 P.2d 745,747
(1994) (The duty to defend is determined by comparing the factual allegations of the complaint with
provisions of insurance policy). State Farm Fire & Car. Co. v. Price, 101 N.M. 438,684 P.2d 524 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 362,683 P.2d 44 (1984) (Before the duty to defend arises there must be a
demand). Overruled on other grounds in Ellingwoodv. N N. Investors Life Ins. Co., I 1 1 N.M. 301,306,
805 P.2d 70 (1991).
Asley, supra, at 4-5; American Motorist Ins. Co. v Southwestern GreyhoundLines,Inc., 283 P.2d 684,
649 (10" Cir. 1960).
6' Ashley, supra, at 4-7.

the suit."2 Thus, as long as the complaint alleges at least one issue that is covered under
the terms of the policy, the insurer must defend!'
Where there is a question as to coverage or where a claim is ambiguous, the
insurer is required to resolve ambiguities in favor of potential coverage for purposes of its
duty to defend." Although certain claims in the underlying action may be outside the
policy, claims within the scope of the policy will invoke the duty to defend!5

Therefore,

when doubt exists as to whether any of the allegations of a third-party complaint are
covered, the denial of coverage should not be determined unilaterally by the insurer, but
should be made in favor of the insured or by the court.M
As an example, in Foundation Reserve Insurance Co, v. MulIinex,6' the insured
was sued for negligently causing a motor vehicle accident which damaged a truck he was
towing. The allegations of the complaint were unclear about the circumstances of the
accident, and merely stated that the insured had operated his tow truck negligently and
that the claimants towed truck was damaged as a result. The insured made demand on his
insurer to defend, but the insurer refused citing the policy's exclusion for towed vehicles.
"American Employers' Insurance Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 85 N.M. 346,512 P.2d 664,677 (1973);
See also Bernalillo Counly Deputy Sheriffs Assh v. County of Bernalillo, 1 14 N.M. 695,697-99, 845 P.2d
789,791-93 (1992) (if allegations of complaint clearly fall outside provisions of the policy, defense is not
required).
"State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Price, 101 N.M. 438,442,684 P.2d 524,528 (Ct. App.), cert denied, 101
N.M. 362,683 P.2d 44,48 (1984)(As long as the claimant has pleased any grounds against the insured
coming within the terms of the policy, the insurer is required to defend).
Marshall v. Providence WashingtonIns. Co., 1997 WL 765625 (N.M. Ct. App); State Farm Fire & Cm.
Co. v. Price, 101 N.M. 438,684 P.2d 524 cat. denied, 101 N.M. 363,683 P.2d 44 (1984), overmled on
other grounds.
6s Valley Improvement Ass,. Znc, v. UnitedStates Fideliy & Guaranly Corp., 129 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir.
1997)(citing Employers Insurance Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 85 N.M. 346,5 12 P.2d 674,677
(1973)(''Although certain claims in the underlying state court action may have been outside the policy,
other claims clearly were within the scope of the policy.").
American, 512 P.2d at 677; See also Servants of the Paraclete, Inc. v. Great American Ins. Co., 857 F .
Supp. 822,832 (D.N.M. 1994).

The court stated that from the face of the complaint itself, it could not be determined with
certainty that the incident came within the exclusionary lang~age.~'When the allegations
of a complaint are ambiguous, the insured is entitled to a defense. The insurer cannot just
unilaterally decide that there is no coverage for the purpose of its duty to defend.69
The insurer's duty to defend extends even to actions where the insurance
company's own investigation has revealed that the claim sued upon is not in fact
covered.70Most jurisdictions agree that for the purposes of establishing the duty to
defend, an insurer may not rely upon facts outside of the complaint to demonstrate that
Similarly, if the allegations of the complaint are not
the claim is not ~overed.~'
dispositive and the insurer learns from extrinsic evidence that coverage probably exists,

''

the duty to defend is triggered. For example, suppose a complaint alleges that the

P

insured committed an intentional tort. Standing alone, the allegations do not give rise to
the duty to defend because intentional acts generally fall under policy exclusions.
However, if the insurer becomes aware of extrinsic evidence tending to show that the
insured negligently injured the plaintiff, the duty to defend is triggered.73 This rule is
designed to protect insureds by preventing insurance companies from escaping their

97 N.M. 618,642 P.2d 604 (1982).
"Id. at 605, 606.
67

69

Id.

Foundation Reserve, Ins. Co. v. Mullenix, 97 N.M.618,620,642 P.2d 604,606 (1982).
Smirti & workman, supra, at 330.
n See Valley Improvement Ass. Inc. v. United States Fideli?, & Guaranty Corp., 129 F.3d 1108 (loh Cu.
1997) (citing American General Fire & Car. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Co., I10 N . M . 741,799 P.2d 1 113,
1 1 16 (1990)rthe duty to defend may also arise from unpleaded facts actually known to the insurer which
arguably bring the claim within the scope of coverage").
Id.
71

"

obligations simply because the plaintiff failed to allege the proper facts in his or her
~ornplaint.~~
D. Conflicts of Interest and Resewation of Rights
A common issue in bad faith duty to defend suits is the conflict of interest

between the insurer and the insured." If the insurer undertakes to defend the insured and
believes that it will not have an obligation to pay the third party claim despite a judgment
against the insured, the insurer can protect itself by having the insured sign a non-waiver
agreement or by sending the insured a reservations of rights notice.76 A non-waiver
agreement is a contract between the insured and insurer in which the insurer agrees to
continue with the defense, but reserves the right to contest coverage in the event a
judgment is entered against the insured." In effect, it is a reservation of rights letter to
which the insured has ~onsented.~'A reservation of rights notice is basically a notice sent
by the insurer stating its right to contest co~erage?~
The reservation of rights notice has a
weaker effect than the non-waiver agreement because it does not demonstrate the
insured's consent?'
Conflicts of interest generally arise where an insurer defends under a resewation
of rights, although the reservation does not automatically create a conflict of interest." A
conflict arises when the basis for the reservation of rights is such as to cause the insurer to

"Jeny, 11, supra, at

797

7%ee,e.g. American Employers Ins. Co. v. Crawford, 87 N.M. 375,533 P.2d 1203 (1975)
Sanerwhite v. Sfolz,79 N.M.320,442 P.2d 810 (Ct. App. 1968).
"Id. at 797.
77 Id.
"Id.
Id. at 798.
Id.
Smirti & Workman, supra at 34 1 .

"

assert factual or legal theories that undermine or are contrary to the positions to be
asserted in the liability case.82 Suppose a third party makes two claims against the
insured in a personal injury case-negligence

and assault and battery. If the policy

specifically excludes intentional acts, the insurer will not be liable for payment of a
judgment entered against the insured if liability is established. However, if the injuries
were the result of the insured's negligence, then the insurer will be liable for any
judgment up to the policy limits.
When a complaint alleges both covered and excluded acts, the insurer is put in a
difficult position of defending its insured and protecting its own interests.83 If the insurer
tries to exculpate itself by showing an intentional injury, it exposes the policyholder to a
greater liability." On the other hand, if the insurer foregoes the exclusionary provision of
the policy, it exposes itself to liability in the event a judgment is entered against the
insured. Under a resewation of rights, the insurer is able to defend the insured while
maintaining its defenses to coverage under the
Once a conflict arises, the insurer can continue to provide counsel disclosing the
conflict, or the insurer can choose to waive its defenses. However, in New Mexico, the
insurer is not excused from defending the insured simply because a conflict arises." If
the insurer chooses to defend the insured under a reservation of rights, the conflict may be
resolved by hiring independent counsel to control the insured's defense, allowing the
insured to select private counsel, or by hiring two sets of attorneys, one to represent the
Slate Farm Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 216 Cal.App.3d 1222,265 Cal.Rptr. 372,374 (1989).
"See Sallenvhilev. Stolz, 79 N.M.320,442P.2d 810 (Ct. App. 1968).
Id.

Id.

insurer and another the insured." Note, however, that the loyalty of counsel hired by the
insurer may later be questioned by the insured in a claim for bad faith failure on the basis
the insuer failed to retain defense of the insured's case.'' Although there is no way to
completely eliminate possible prejudice to the insured, an insurer can take steps to reduce
its potential liability by fully informing the insured of the conflict of interest, and
advising the insured of the right to obtain other counsel.89

E.

Settlement Obligations
Although liability insurance policies typically create a duty to defend, they do not

.~
the typical policy language allows the
by their terms create a duty to ~ e t t l e Instead,
insurer to exercise its discretion in deciding whether or not to settle a claim against the
insured?' Nonetheless, this discretion is limited. Although an insurer has discretion in
deciding whether to accept an offer of settlement, the insurer must timely investigate and
fairly evaluate a claim against its insured before making any settlement decision^.^^ The
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires insurers to settle claims against
their insureds within policy limits whenever there is a substantial likelihood of recovery
in excess of policy limits?3

=American Employers'Ins. Co. v. Craufrd, 87 N.M. 375,381,533 P.2d 1203, 1209 (1975).
" Id
"See e.g. American Employers' at 379,533 P.2d 1207.
a9 rd.
90 ~mbassador
Ins. Co. v St. Paul Fire & Marine, 102 N.M. 28,30,690 P.2d 1022, 1024 (1984).
Id. at 1025
" Id.
See Torrez v. State Farm Murual Auto. Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 1 192, 1 195 (loh Cir. 1982).

'

,P

F.

Negligent Failure to Settle
A number of courts have construed the insurer's duty in responding to settlement

offers in terms of good faith rather than due care.94 An insured may not recover damages
from the insurer for negligently refusing to accept a settlement offer. For example, an
insured cannot sue the insurer merely because the insurance company failed to correctly
predict the outcome of the third party's action against the insured?'
In Ambassador Insurance Company v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance

Compand6 the New Mexico Supreme Court determined that New Mexico would not
recognize an action for an insurer's negligent failure to settle. In that case, the excess
insurance carrier brought an action against the primary insurance carrier alleging that the
primary insurer negligently failed to settle a medical malpractice claim.g7
The Ambassador wurt reasoned that there is always a chance that the insured's
case will fail at trial and a judgment could be entered in excess of policy limits.98 Under a
theory of negligence, the only precaution available to the "ordinary and prudent man"
would be to settle within policy limits.99 Such a standard would force insurers to settle
every case despite their honest belief that the settlement offer is much higher than the
amount that would ultimately be awarded.'"

Ashley, supra, 2-9
Id. at 2-14
102 N.M.28,690 P.2d 1022 (1984).
97 Id. at 1023.
98 Id. at 1024.
* Id.
Irn
Id.
95

"

Moreover, the court felt that by imposing a

negligence standard on insurers, it would be creating a duty that has not been expressly
agreed to by the parties.lo1
Whether the court's decision is sound on public policy grounds remains to be
debated. The reasoning behind the court's decision also raises questions as to whether
the action for bad faith is grounded in contract or in tort.'02 Nevertheless, the court did
clarify thatthe implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was an exception to the
general rule that only those obligations contained in the written agreement will be
imposed upon the parties.lo3
When the insurer has taken over the defense of a third party claim against its
insured, the insurer must do so in good faith.IM An insurer who fails to properly
investigate the claim or to become familiar with the applicable law, or who refuses to
settle while disregarding the interests of its insured may be liable for bad faith.'Os In this
instance, the insurer's negligence in evaluating or settling the case is an element tending
to prove bad faith.'06

G.

The Breach of Settlement Obligations
Prior to the development of the law of bad faith, insurers often used the threat of a

judgment in excess of the policy limits to coerce the insured into contributing to a

Id.
Although in a later opinion, Jessen v. National Excess Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 1244 (N.M.1989) the court
reaffmed that an insurer's refusal to pay a first-party claim raises a bad faith action sounding in tort.
Id.
IWid. at 1025
'05 See Lujan v. Gonzales, 84 N.M.
229,237,501 P.2d 673,681 (Ct. App.), cert. denied. 84 N.M. 219,501
P.2d 663 (1972)
I" Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Sf. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.CO.,102 N.M.28,690 P.2d 1022 (1984), (instances
where the insurance company failed to settle a claim because it was negligent in investigating the claim or
it failed to become familiar with the applicable law were strong evidence of bad faith).
lol

Io2

settlement."' Today such conduct generally subjects the insurer to liability for bad
faith.'''

The same is true where the insurer refuses to settle unless a codefendant or its

insurer contributes to the ~ettlernent.''~If a third-party plaintiff offers to settle a claim
against the insured for an amount exceeding policy limits, the insurer must be careful to
respond in a manner that avoids incurring liability for bad faith."'
Moreover, the insurer may not put its own interests over those of its insured by
ignoring settlement offers simply because they ask for more than the policy limits."' The
insurer is required to fully disclose to its insured all matters that could affect the insured's
interest, including any and all settlement offers. 'IZ If the insured wishes, he or she may
make up the difference between the amount demanded and the policy limits."'
An insurer is also required to examine the facts surrounding the third party's

claim against its insured, evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the third party's
case. 114 If the insurer fails to conduct a competent investigation or to evaluate the case
honestly, this can be evidence of bad faith.'''
In most jurisdictions, the insurer is not held liable for breaching its duty to settle
unless a settlement offer has been made and the insurer is presented with a covered
claim.Il6 Although there is no precise definition of what constitutes breach of the duty to

Ashley, supra, 3-4.
Id.
"I Id, at 3-5
" O Id. at 3-8
" I Id. at 3-9; See also Lujan v. Gonzales, 84 N . M . 229,237,501 P.2d 673,681 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 84
N.M. 219 501 P.2d 663 (1972).
"'Id. at 3-2 1
Id. at 3-9
"'Id. at 3-10
Id. at 3-13
' I 6 Id.
Iin
la'

settle, the duty of good faith requires at a minimum, "an honest, intelligent, and fair
weighing of the probabilities of liability of the insured, and a diligent effort to ascertain
the facts and law upon which only an intelligent and good faith judgment may be
predicated.""'

The duty of good faith compels acceptance of a settlement offer only if

the offer is within policy limits."'

Nevertheless, settlement offers that exceed the

primary insurer's policy limits present special problems.'19
The primary insurer's response to a settlement offer above policy limits depends
on whether the insured has excess liability insurance.'" If there is excess insurance and
the primary insurer tenders its policy limits to settle the case, then the burden rests upon
the excess carrier to respond in good faith.12' If there is no excess insurance, the insurer
must take care to inform its insured without appearing to demand c~ntribution.'~~
H.

Settlements Made By the Insured.
When an insurer has denied that its policy affords coverage for a claim brought

against its insured, the insured may enter into a settlement or agree to have judgment
entered against him or her on the condition the judgment is collectible only from
available insurance.123Such an agreement is binding on the insurer as long as the

Ambassador Ins. Co. v St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 102 N . M . 28,30,690 P.2d 1022, 1024 (1984).
Id.
Ashley, supra, 3-3 1.
Id.
Id.
Id., 3-31.
I" Srnbti & Workman,supra, at 337.
]I7

settlement entered into without the insurer's consent or knowledge is reasonable and
conducted in good faith.'24
Generally, a settlement is "reasonable" if a reasonably prudent person in the
insured's position would have accepted it after considering the facts regarding liability
and damages and the risks of going to trial.12' In evaluating the reasonableness of the
insured's settlement, the trier of fact may take into consideration "any evidence of bad
faith, collusion or fraud" on the part of the insured.12" A negotiated settlement becomes
collusive when its purpose is to injure the interests of the absent insurer.127Possible
indicators of the insured's bad faith in making the settlement include unreasonableness,
misrepresentation, concealment, secretiveness and profit to insured.Iz8Consequently,
even though the insurance company wrongfully fails to defend or settle a claim against its
insured, it may be able to assert as a defense that the settlement was itself tainted.12'
I.

Third-Party Remedies
An insurer suffers serious consequences when it breaches its duty to defend."'

The consequences for a breach of the duty to defend fall into two categories: damages for
harm caused to the insured, and loss of the insurer's rights under the policy.I3' In
particular, upon breach by the insurance company, the insured may assume control of his

lu American Gen. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Co., I10 N.M. 741,746,799 P.2d 1 113, 1 1 18
(1990)(even where insurer's failure to defend is wrongful, any "settlement must be reasonable, and the
insurer is not precluded from asserting as a defense that the settlement was unreasonable").
12' Smirti & Workman, supra, at 337.
'26 Servants of theparaclete, lnc. v. Great American Ins. Co., 866 F.Supp. 1560, 1574 (D.N.M. 1994).
'21 ContinenfalCas. Co. v. Westerfed, 961 F. Supp. 1502, 1504 (D.N.M. 1997).
12' See Continental Cas. Co., 961 F.Supp. at 1504 0 . N . M . 1997).
'= Id.
'I0 Lujan v. Gonzales, 84 N.M. 220,501, P.2d 673 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 219,501 P.2d 553
11972).
"I Ashley, supra, 4-1 3.

or her defense and is no longer obligated to cooperate with the in~urer."~
The insured is
also relieved of its obligations in claims processing and is not required to file proof of
loss or give other notice.'" The insured may also enter into reasonable settlements
without the insurer's knowledge or ~ 0 n s e n t . l ~ ~
An inswer who refuses to participate in or at least monitor the progress of
settlement negotiations abdicates any rights to object to the final settlement and may be
liable for damages."' Moreover, if the insurer refuses to defend and then refuses to settle
a claim against its insured in bad faith, it could be held liable for the judgment entered
against its insured even if the judgment exceeds policy limits.136An inswer may also be
bound by a settlement agreement made by its insured despite having a good faith belief
that there was no coverage and a court later finds coverage."' Added to these damages
are the costs of bringing the bad faith action against the insurer, the costs incurred in
defending the original action and damages for mental anguish.13'
Courts hold insurers to the terms of settlement agreements made without their
involvement because of the significant influence the company's absence can have on the

'" State Farm Fire & Car.Co. v. Price, 101 N.M. 438,684 P.2d 524 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M.
362,683 P.2d 44 (1984). Overruled on other grounds.
13' Id.
See e.g. American Gen. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Progressive Car.Co., 1 10 N.M. 74 1,746,799 P.2d 1113,
1118(1990).
'I5 Lujanv. Gonzales, 84 N.M. 229,244,501 P.2d 673,688 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 219,501 P.2d
663 (1972).
'I6
Foundation Reserves Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 388 F.2d 528, 532 (10' Cis. 1968); Lujan v. Gonzales, 84 N.M.
229,244,501 P.2d 673,688 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 84N.M. 219,501 P.2d663 (1972).
Rummel v. Lexington Ins. Co., 945 P.2d 970 (1997).
"'Lujan v. G o d e s , 84 N.M. 229,244,501 P.2d 673,688 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 219,501 P.2d
663 (1972).(insurer is liable to the insured for the reasonable and necessary expenses which the insured has
incurred in conducting the defense, attorney's fees incurred in the defense of the action brought against
him, and for attorney fees incurred in bad faith suit);

I"

'''

final outcome in the case against the insured.'39 An insurer who abandons its insured
exposes the insured to a greater risk of personal liability.l4' Under these circumstances, it
is not unreasonable for an abandoned insured to enter into an agreement limiting his or
her liability in order to avoid litigation of the claim at his or her own expense.I4'
Therefore, if the court finds coverage, the insurer will be bound by the terms of the

The New Mexico Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether an
insurer can argue the issue of coverage after breaching its duty to defend. In Stare Farm
Fire & Casual@ Co. v. Price,143the appellate court held that an insurer who breaches its

duty to defend losses the right to claim: I) the insured breached the policy provisions, 2)
failed to cooperate, 3) failed to forward suit papers, 4) settled without its consent, and 5)
becomes liable for a judgment entered against the insured and for any settlement entered
into by the insured in good faith.'"

A number of jurisdictions have held that an insurer

who fails to defend its insured is properly estopped from later denying coverage.'4s The
policy underlying this decision is that by breaching its duty under one part of the contract,
the insurer should not be allowed to enforce another part of the contract to assert

Id.
'"Id. at 984.
" I Id. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Paynter, 122 Ariz. 198,201,593 P.2d 948,95 1 (Ct. App
1979)) can abandoned insured may enter into a reasonable agreement limiting his liability in order to
avoid litigation of the claim at his own expense").
"I Id. at 984.
101 N.M. 438,684 P.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1984).
'"Id.
"I Jeny, 11, supra, at 348.
"See. e.g. Clemmons v. Travelers Im. Co,88 111.2d 469,430 N.E.2d 1104 (1981); Missionaries of Co. of
Mary, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 155 Corn. 104,230 A.2d 21 (1967).

"'

However, in the Servants of the Paraclete, Inc. v. Great American Insurance

Company,'47the United States District Court applied the principles of normal contract law
to a bad faith failure to defend suit. In that case, the court held that the insurer had a right
to raise the issue of coverage stating, "the injured party in a contract breach is entitled to
receive what would have been obtained had there been no breach."14* The Servants court
reasoned, "by finding the insurer had a duty to indemnify as a penalty for refusing to
defend, even if no coverage exists, the court has improperly enlarged the bargained-for
coverage.,r
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This finding appears to be inconsistent with New Mexico bad faith law. The
Servants court is correct when it states that the insurance contract determines what duties
exist. However, New Mexico imposes the duty of good faith and fair dealing into all
insurance contracts. An insurer who breaches its duty of good faith and fair dealing is
subject to liability for extra contractual damages.
For example, an insurer unjustifiably fails to defend its insured against a meritless
suit. The insured lacks the financial means to pay for an attorney to defend the suit and
subsequently incurs liability for a settlement the insured would not otherwise have
suffered. Following the reasoning in Servants, the insurer would not have a duty to pay
the settlement upon a finding of breach since there was no coverage under the policy to
begin with. The error in this analysis is that situations similar to this scenario were
largely responsible for courts imposing the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing into the law of insurance bad faith.

Valley Improvement Association, Inc. v. United Stares Fidelity & Guaranty Corp.,
appears to have overruled Servants. In Valley, the Tenth Circuit Court held that an
insurer who breached its duty to defend could be held liable for its pro rata share of
settlements made on certain claims without a determination of whether the claims settled
were within policy coverage. Is0 The court noted that an insurer who breached its duty to
defend could not latcr challenge a settlement complaining that the claims were not within
coverage.15' An insurer who abandons its insured within the course of litigation will be
bound to a reasonable settlement entered into by the insured.ls2 The only restriction on
this principle is that the settlement be reasonable.Iu Thus, rather than applying
traditional contract law to the insurer's assertion of non-coverage, the Valley court more
appropriately focused its analysis on the principles of good faith and fair dealing.
IV.

FIRST-PARTY BAD FAITH
The second context in which bad faith actions have arisen is that of first-party

insurance. In a first-party bad faith action, the insured asserts a claim for the insurer's
wrongdoing or bad faith performance of its obligations under the insurance contract. A
typical first-party action is one where the insured is seeking to recover for his or her own
loss or injuries covered under the terms of the insurance

Id.
129 F.3d 1108 (1997).
Is' Id. at 1 125.
Is= Id.
la Id.
I n Charter Services, Inc. v. Principal Mut, Life Ins. Co., 117 N . M . 82, 87,868 P.2d 1307, 1312 (ct. App.
1994).
Ib9
Is'

Although the law of bad faith has been widely received in the third-party context,
it has not acquired such acceptance in fmt-party cases.ls5In the first-party context, an
insured generally has a clear and express breach of contract claim which allows the
insured to sue on the policy.'s6 Moreover, the fiduciary relationship inherent in the thirdparty setting (in which the insurer undertakes the defense of the insured) does not exist in
the first-party setting. According to critics, it is the establishment of the fiduciary
relationship in the third-party context that justifies the need for tort remedies. 157
Jurisdictions following a contractual approach, limit the recovery of damages in
first-party cases to those either arising naturally out of the breach or those within the
contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made.Is8 However, a number of
jurisdictions including New Mexico, have applied the law of bad faith to first-party
actions.Is9
The breach of an insurer's obligation of good faith and fair dealing was first
extended to the area of first-party insurance by the California Court of Appeals in

Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.'" In that case, the insured sued his
insurance company for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress for its refusal
to indemnify him under a disability policy. The court affirmed a lower court's judgment
on the latter cause of action. The court held that the duty of good faith and fair dealing

Is' Douglas R. Richmond, An overview oflnsurance bad Faith Law andlitigation. 25 Seton Hall. L. Rev.
74, 104 (1994).
Jeny, 11, supra, at 158.
"'Id.
See Jerry, 11, supra, at 158.
Hale v Basin Motor Co., 110 N.M.314,759 P.2d 1006 (1990).
89 Cal.Reph. 78 (Ct. App. 1970).

"'

imposed a duty on the insurer not to withhold payments maliciously or without probable
cause.161
However, courts adopting the first-party bad faith action are cautious not to
interfere with the insurer's right to contest a claim when there is a reasonable basis for
denying proceeds. A number ofjurisdictions require that the insurer engage in some
deliberate conduct, although this conduct need not rise to the level of unlawful or
l ~ New
~ Mexico, an insurer is held liable for bad faith when it
malicious b e h a ~ i 0 r . In
refuses to pay a claim for reasons that are determined to be "frivolous" or "~nfounded."'~~
An insurer does not act in bad faith by denying a claim for reasons which are reasonable

under the terms of the policy.lM Where payment of policy proceeds depends on an issue
that is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to debate that issue.165
There is a multitude of misconduct that can be considered warranting a bad faith
action. Some of these actions include: the insurer's failure to investigate the claim
thoroughly; unreasonable delay in payment of a claim; unreasonable litigation tactics to
avoid payment; using improper standards to deny claim; and other types of di~regard.'~~
Nevertheless, the term "unfounded" does not simply mean "erroneous" or "incorrect."
In Jackson National Life Insurance Co. v. Receconi,16' the court held that the term
"unfounded" meant the same thing as "reckless disregard." To hold an insurer liable for

'I

id. at 93.
Jeny, 11, supra, at 159.

''' Chavez v. Chenoweth, 89 N.M.423,553 P.2d 703 (Ct. App. 1976).
'" UnifedNuclearCorp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 480,790 P.2d 649 (1985).
Id.
H. Walter Croskey, Marcus M. Kaufman, David B. Casselman, Rex Heeseman, Thomas W. Johnson,
Jr.,C Patrick M.Kelly, California Practice Guide Insurance Litigation, Cal. Prac. Guide. Ins. Lit. Ch 12cD (1995).
I" 113 N.M.403, 827 P.2d 118 (1992).
16'

bad faith, the insurer must "utterly fail to exercise care for the interests of the insured
either in denying a claim or delaying payment of a claim.'68 Thus, for an insured to sue
on the basis of bad faith the insurer's refusal to pay proceeds must not only be
unreasonable, the insurer's refusal must lack any arguable support.'"
The duty of the insurance company toward its insured includes a duty to the
insured to make a reasonably prompt investigation of all relevant facts.'" If the insurance
company cannot give its insured a valid reason for denying the claim, it has a final duty
to promptly honor it."' An insurer may not simply refuse to investigate the insured's
claim using its failure to verify the claim as a justification for denial of coverage.ln
Delay also may form the basis of a bad faith action when there is evidence of a
frivolous or unfounded refusal to pay.'73 Mere delay in the payment of insurance
proceeds is generally not sufficient to support a bad faith action where the insurance
company owes no policy benefits.'74 However, an insurer who drags its feet in paying a
valid claim may incur liability for bad faith. If the insurer has no doubts concerning
liability, it must promptly pay over the proceed^.'^'

'"Id. at 419, 827 P.2d 133(citing Jessen v. National Excess Ins. Co., 108 N.M. 625,628,776 P.2d 1244,
1247 (1989) overruled on other grounds in Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 1 18 N.M.203,210, 880
P.2d 300,307 (1994).
I m Id.
I7O Id.
I" Jessen v. NationalExcess Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 1244, 1248 (1989) (citing Bankers Life & Car. Co. v.
Crenshaw, 483 So.2d 254,276 (Miss. 1985) overruled on other grounds.
In Id
In Chavezv. Chenoweth, 89 N.M. 423,553 P.2d 703 (Ct. App. 1976).
'" WoodmenAccident & LifeCo. v. Bryant, 784 F.2d 1052 (10" Cir. 1986Xfive month delay preceding
denial of coverage could not be bad faith where court determined ultimately that there was no duty to pay,
relying on Chmez, supra.)

A.

Issues in Contract Interpretation
First-party cases often arise out of disagreements between the insurer and the

insured concerning the coverage afforded by the policy. The interpretation of a contract's
terms can have a significant impact on whether the insurer acted in bad faith by its
deliberate misrepresentation of the terms to the insured; misinterpreting the policy
language to avoid paying premiums; or whether its denial of premiums will be construed

as arbitrary and unfounded.
When separate sections of a policy appear to conflict with one another, or terms
appear ambiguous or do not expressly address whether certain matters are covered, their
resolution becomes a matter for the ~ 0 u r t . IIn
~~
determining the existence of an
ambiguity, the court considers the language at issue from the viewpoint of the
"reasonably intelligent layman," in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the
Moreover, the contract is construed as a whole.'78 If any provisions appear
ambiguous on their face, or the insuring clauses conflict with exclusionary clauses, the
contract will be construed in favor of the in~ured."~
The New Mexico Supreme Court has stressed the importance of protecting
Insurance contracts
ordinary policyholders untutored in the intricacies of in~urance."'~
are complex contracts of adhesion, prepared by the insurer without negotiation as to

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Monroya, 90 N.M. 556, 566 P.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1977).

'" Rummel v. Lexington Ins. Co., 945 P.2d 970 (1997).

'"Id. at 976.
I" Id.
"Id. at 977.
'sI Kingv. The Travelers Ins. Co., 84 N.M. 550, 556, 505 P.2d 1226, 1232 (1973)(citing Pribble v. Aefna
Life Ins. Co., 84 N.M. 211,501 P.2d255 (1972).

policy terms."' Therefore, to protect the reasonable expectation of insureds, they should
be given a broad measure of protection.18' It is the responsibility of the insurer to make
sure all the exclusions and vital conditions are made plain, clear and prominent to the
average p~lic~holder.'~'
The rules of contract construction are especially narrow when applied to the
exclusionary provisions of insurance policies. If the insurer urges an exception to
coverage that the policy does not clearly express, "the courts will not write an exclusion
into it by construction, for the purpose of exempting the insurer from liability."'84
Insurers must make exclusionary language clear and specific. Such requirements not
only protect the reasonable expectation of insureds, they also serve as a guideline for
courts in determining the reasonableness of the insurer's refusal to pay policy proceeds.
B.

First-Party Remedies
The most basic element of recovery by the insured is the amount ofproceeds of

the policy that have been withheld by the insurer. As noted earlier, the aspects of the
relationship between insurers and their insureds are contractual (e.g., an insurer's failure
to pay proceeds after receiving notice of a covered loss generally constitutes breach of
contract). Under general contract principles, the insured is to be put in the position he or
she would have enjoyed had there been no breach. Under the general tort principles of

"' Id.

See also, Federal Ins. Co.v. Century, 113 N.M.at 168,824 P.2d at 308 ("giving effect to the
insured's reasonable expectations in cases of policy ambiguity, is of course a well-settled approach to
construing and applying language in insurance policies.")
Id. at 557.
Id.
Iaa Rummel v. Lexington Ins. Co., 945 P.2d 970,982.

bad faith, the insured may also recover attorneys fees, interest, damages for emotional
distress and punitive damages.lS5
V.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages are allowed in bad faith actions as a way to punish the

wrongdoer and as a means of deterring unfair insurance pra~tices."~The assessment of
punitive damages for breach of an insurance contract requires evidence of either bad faith
or malice on the part of the insurer.'" However, where the evidence supports a jury
instruction on compensatory damages for the insurer's bad faith, an instruction for
punitive damages may also be given."'
In New Mexico, the standard of conduct required for punitive damages in bad
faith actions appears to be the same whether the action is brought on some type of first

P

party coverage or on a liability poli~y."~
New Mexico has historically allowed the award
of punitive damages in insurance bad faith cases under what has appeared to be a more
relaxed standard, in part because of the fiduciary obligations inherent in insurance

la' See e.g. Charter Services, Inc., v. Principai Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1 17 N.M. 82, 868 P.2d 1307
(1994Xaward of pre-judgment interest pursuant to statute applicable to all actions is discretionary with the
h.ial court, but interest should be awarded as a matter of right where defendant has breached contract to pay
a definite sum of money), Jackson National Life Ins. Co. v. Receconi, 113 N . M . 403,420,827 P.2d 118,
135 (1992)(when insurer has unreasonably failed to pay claim, there is a presumption in favor of award of
attorney fees, and thus there must be good reason for not awarding fees in that circumstance)(citingNMSA
1978.5 39-2-1); Jackson National Life Ins. Co. v. Receconi, 113 N.M. 403,827 P.2d 118
(1992)(assessment of punitive damages requires evidence of bad faith); WoodmenAccient & Life Ins. Co.
v. Bryant, 784 F.2d 1052, 1057 (10' Cir. 1986)(emotional distress damages are awardable in a breach of
contract action when the breach causes bodily harm or if the breach results in serious emotional distress).
Charter Services, Inc. v. Pricipal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 117 N.M. 82,87,868 P.2d 1307.13 12 (Ct. App.
1994) (citing Conant v. Rodruguez, 113 N.M. 513,828 P.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1992).
Jackson Nut. Life Ins. Co. v. Receconi, 1 13 N.M. 403,827 P.2d 118 (1992).
IMN.M.U.J.I. 13-1718, See Jessen v. NationaiErcessIm Co., 108 N . M . 625,776 P.2d 1244, 1246 (1989)
overruled on other grounds.
Is9SeeN.M.U.J.I. 13-1827, committee comment (New Mexico's courts do not distinguish between pure
tort and contract in the application of punitive damages).

relationships and because of concerns about the unequal bargaining positions of insurers
and their insureds.'"
In a typical breach of contract action, punitive damages are recoverable only
"when the conduct of the wrongdoer may be said to be maliciously intentional,
fraudulent, oppressive, or committed recklessly or with a wanton disregard of the
Plaintiffs right^."'^' Even when the claim involves an insurance contract, a finding of
negligence or even gross negligence is not enough to support an award of punitive
damages.19' There must be evidence the breaching party acted with at least reckless
disregard for the interest of the non-breaching party.'93 Unless the insurer's conduct rises
to the level of recklessness or bad faith, an insured who sues the insurer for breach of
contract is limited to seeking damages that arise out of the breach of contract.Ig" The
standard of conduct is the same for general tort cases.'gs
At one time, grossly negligent behavior supported a finding of bad faith and an
award of punitive damages. For example, in UnitedNuclear Corp. K Allendale Mut.

Ins.,'% the court held that a showing of an insurer's "unfounded" or "frivolous" refusal to
pay proceeds supported a finding of bad faith and a jury instruction on punitive damages.

I" Romero V. Menyn's, 109 N.M.249,255 784 P.2d 992 n. 3 (1989). See also Cafteria Operators, L.P.
v. CoronadoSanta Fe Associates, L.P., WL 809222 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Paiz v. Stale Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 1 18 N.M. 203,Z 10 880 P.2d 300,307 (1994) (in a breach of contract case, punitive damages
must be predicated on a showing of bad faith, or a showing that the breaching patty acted with reckless
disregard for the interests of the non-breaching party)
19' See UnitedNuclear Corp. v Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 103 N.M.480,485,709 P.2d 649,654 (1985).
'91 Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 1 18 N.M. 203, 880 P.2d 300 (1994).
Id. at 210,880 P.2d 307 (a party acts with reckless disregard when it knows of potential harm to the
interests of the plaintiff but nonetheless 'unerly fails to exercise care' to avoid the hard).
'* Id. (citing Ambassador Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 102 N.M. 28-3 I, 690 P.2d 1022,
1023-25 (1984).
IPS Hinger v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. 120 N.M. 430,902 P.2d 1033 (Ct. App. 1995).
103 N.M. 480,485,709 P.2d 649,654 (1985).

However, in that case the court determined that the insurer had a legitimate basis to deny
coverage and had not acted in bad faith.19'
Judge Bivins, whose concurrence was necessary for a majority, thought that
punitive damages in bad faith actions should only be allowed where there is either a
Thus, Judge Bivins argued that upon
showing of "intention to harm" or "re~klessness."'~~
a determination of bad faith, punitive damages should only be allowed where the
insurer's conduct rises to the level of reckless di~regard.'~~
The construction of bad faith as a "frivolous or unfounded" refusal to pay under
the terms of the policy was affirmed in Jessen v. National Excess Ins. c0.2~
The Jessen
court broaden the definition of bad faith to include delay in paying a claim for frivolous
or unfounded reasons.'"' In that case, the court clarified that a finding of either gross
negligence or reckless disregard for the interests of the insured would support an award of
punitive damages in a breach of contract claim against an i n s ~ r e r . 2In~ 1992, the standard
for first-party bad faith changed. In Jackson National Life Ins. Co. v. Receconi?" the
New Mexico Supreme Court held an award of punitive damages would be awarded in a
bad faith action only when the insurer's "frivolous" or "unfounded" refusal to pay
constituted a "reckless disregard" of the insured's interests.

Id.
Id. at 489.
'" Id.
ZOO Jessen v. National Excess Ins. Co., 108 N . M . 625,776 P.2d 1244 (1989) overruled on other grounds.
lo' Id.
'"Id. at 628,776 P.2d at 1247; However, also See Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 1 18 N.M.203,880
P.2d 300 (1994)(in breach of contract case, including one involving insurance contract, punitive damages
may not be predicated solely on gross negligence, but on a showing of bad faith or reckless disregard).
'" 113 N.M.403, P.2d 118 (1992).
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Although no New Mexico court has considered whether a gross negligence
standard will support a claim for bad faith in the third-party context, it will be interesting
to see how the courts deal with the insurer's failure to defend. To support a finding of
bad faith, must the evidence show that the insurer's failure to defend was done in reckless
disregard of the insured's interests? Is this standard consistent with the current law
surrounding the duty to defend?
VI.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN BAD FAITH ACTIONS
Not surprisingly, insurers have attempted to prevent bad faith claims by

developing preventive measures and workable defenses. An insurer may raise a number
of defenses including the statute of limitations and failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.2MHowever, this paper explores three emerging and somewhat
controversial defenses: comparative bad faith, comparative fault, and ERISA
Preemption.
A.

Comparative Bad Faith
The duty of good faith and fair dealing is owed by both the insurer and the

insured.20s An insurer who has acted in bad faith may seek relief for an insured's breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'"

For example, a comparative

bad faith defense may be raised by counsel for the insurance company when the insured
fails to comply with his or her duties, such as misrepresenting requested information or
making a fraudulent claim. The idea of the comparative bad faith defense is that the
insurer should not be subjected to bad faith liability if the insured has also engaged in

'"See Richmond, supra, at 1 1 6.
lm

Modisette v. Foundation Reserves, Ins. Co., 77 N.M.66 I , 427 P.2d 21 (1 967).

misconduct. Generally, however, an insurer cannot raise the defense of comparative bad
faith when the insured merely breached the insurance contract.207
The concept of comparative bad faith first surfaced in Fleming v. Safeco Ins. Co.

ofAmerica, Inc. '08 In that case, the plaintiff was severely injured when the car she was
traveling in was struck by a stolen vehicle. At the time of the accident, Safeco was the
plaintiffs uninsured motorist camer. Although the policy limits were $1 5,000, Safeco
only offered the plaintiff $10,000 to settle her claim. The plaintiff eventually sued Safeco
for bad faith. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in the plaintiffs favor, but determined
that twenty-six percent of the plaintiffs compensatory damages were attributable to her
bad faith and seventy-four percent were attributable to Safeco's bad faith.'09
Although a number of jurisdictions now allow some form of comparative bad
faith principles as viable defenses for insurers, the comparative bad faith theory remains
relatively untested?" Furthermore, the duty of good faith and fair dealing toward the
insurance company remains roughly undefined?" Much of the existing law is from
California, where the theory of comparative bad faith is used as both an affirmative
defense and as a separate cause of action referred to as "reverse bad faith".212

id.
Douglas Richmond, InsuredS BadFaith as Shield or Sword: Litigation Relieffor insurers? 77 Marq. L.
Rev. 41,54 (1993).
'08 206 Cal. Rpt. 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
Iw Fleming, at 3 1 5.
0I' Bany R. Ostrager & Thomas R. Newman, Bad Faith and Wrongful Re@al to Settle: Liabilify in Excess
of Policy Limits, 5 18 PLLiLit 233,287 (1995). Marjie D. Barrows Reverse Bad Faith: Is the Duly of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing Really a Two WayStreet?, In Recurring Issues in Insurance Disputes, 327 (David
L. Leitner, ed. 1996).
'"Ostrager & Newman, supro, at 287.
'I2 id.
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Consequently, under a comparative bad faith defense, if the insured has dealt with
the insurance company dishonestly about a material fact, or with the intent to deceive, he
or she may be prevented from recovering under the bad faith claim?" New Mexico has
not determined whether it will allow such a defense in a bad faith action. In Jessen v.
National Excess Ins. Co.,2I4the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
refusal to submit a comparative bad faith instruction, cautiously stating that it was not
deciding "whether such an instruction necessarily would be inappropriate in another
In determining whether the comparative bad faith defense is an appropriate
defense in New Mexico, the court should consider the significance, if any, of the absence
of anything owed by the insured to the insurer that resembles a fiduciary duty?I6
In Stephens v. Safco Ins. Co. of America:"

the Montana Supreme court

specifically rejected the comparative fault defense in a bad faith action. In that case, the
court reasoned that bad faith is a tort only when the parties have a special relationship?''
While the insured shares a special relationship with the insurer, the reverse is not true.219
The insurer's superior economic position frees it from the fear of oppression and the risk
of financial harm as is true of the insured."' Therefore, comparing the parties respective
causes of action and remedies is like comparing "apples to oranges."22'

'"Marjie Barrows,at 327.

'"108 N.M. 625,776 P.2d 1244 (1989).
id. at 1249
Jeny, 11, supra, at 162.
852 P.2d 565 (Mont. 1993).
"'Id. at 567.
" 9 Id. at 568.
noId.
Id. at 569.
'I'

6I'
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B.

Comparative Fault
In recent years, courts have also begun to allow insurers to claim comparative

fault as a defense to bad faith actions.222The concept of comparative fault has evolved
from a basic principle that a party may not recover for injuring h i or herself, and allows
the court to reduce the amount of damages relative to the fault of the injured party.223
Unlike reverse bad faith, the comparative fault defense is only a partial defense, reducing
damages--not entirely precluding them.
An insurer may seek to avoid its obligations under a policy by claiming the
insured materially breached policy provisions. However, the insurance company must
demonstrate substantial prejudice as a result of the insured's breach.'"

In most cases,

whether the insured acted fairly or whether the insurer was substantially prejudiced by the
actions of the insured are questions for the jury."'
The problem with the comparative fault defense is that it allows the trier of fact to
compare the insured's negligence with the insurer's bad faith or reckless misconduct.
Although New Mexico has recognized comparative negligence since Bartless v. New
Mexico Welding S ~ ~ p lit ~has, 2not~ decided
~
whether a comparative fault jury instruction

'"Ronald S. Range The Setup Defnse and the ComparativeF

d Defnse: New Wrinkles in Bad Faith
Claims Against Insurers. 45 Wash. & Lee. L. Rev. 321 (1988).
2U Id. at 347.
22'State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Price, 101 N.M. 438, 684 P.2d 524 (CtApp.), cert. denied, 101 N.M.
362,683 P.2d 44 (1984) overmled on other grounds.
Id.
P6 98 N.M. 152,646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M.336,648 P.2d 794 (1982).
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would be appropriate as a defense to a bad faith claim.227To date, only California has
officially adopted comparative fault as an affirmative defense in bad faith litigation."
A comparative fault defense gets further complicated under circumstances where
the insurance company breaches its duty to defend the insured. An insurer who fails to
defend loses the right to claim that the insured breached policy provisions, including the
policy provisions requiring the insured to forward suit papers?29 The insurer also loses
the right to claim that the insured did not cooperate, the right to claim the insured settled
without its consent, and becomes liable for any reasonable good faith settlement entered
into by the insured.230In this situation, it is possible that an insurer who fails to defend
may also waive its right to raise a comparative fault defense.
C.

ERISA Preemption
A problematic issue in the area of insurance bad faith involves claims arising

under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act

ERISA is a

comprehensive and complex statutory regime, the scope of which is beyond the purpose
of this paper. However, it is noteworthy to mention it here because of its preemptive
effect in common law breach of contract and bad faith actions.
In 1974, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA") to protect the interests of participants in employee benefit plans (i.e., welfare
and pension ) by requiring disclosure of information, establishing standards of conduct

"'See Jessen v. National Ekcess Ins. Co., 108 N.M.625,630,776 P.2d 1244, 1249 (1989)
Douglas R Richmond, Insured's Bad Faith as Shield or Sword: Litigation Relieffor Insurers? 77
Marq. L. Rev. 4 1,54 (1 993).
'
1
9 State Farm Fire & Car. Co. v. Price, 101 N.M. 438,684 P.2d 524 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M.
362,683 P.2d 44 (1984) ovemled on other grounds.
Id.
29 U.S.C.$9 1001 et seq.
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for plan administrations, and by providing a federal remedy and forum for the benefit of
participants.z3z
ERISA explicitly supersedes "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."233ERISA preemption is sweeping,
superseding common bad faith law with respect to insurance provided as part of an
employee benefit plan.234For example, in Lunn v. Time Insurance

c0.2~'
the plaintiffs

sued their insurance carrier for its alleged breach of an insurance contract and
misrepresentation and bad faith in administration of an ERISA plan. The breach of
contract claim sought benefits under the plan, and the bad faith and misrepresentation
claims related to the plan's administration. The court determined that because the bad
faith claims related to the plan, they were preempted by E R I S A . ~ ~ ~
The preemptive effect of ERISA is substantial because most health insurance, life
insurance, and some disability insurance provide benefits in the employment setting?"
This means that insurers who provide such plans may not be sued for bad faith
performance of their obligations under the
It is important to note that the scope of preemption of ERISA is not infinite, and
certain claims based on state law in some sense which relates to an ERISA plan are not

"'Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of BadFaith In First-Par& Insurance TransactionsAfter Two Decades,
37 Ariz. L. Rev. 1153, 1173 (1995).
"'29 U.S. C. 5 1 144(a).
Jeny, 11, supra, at 158.
'"I10 N.M. 73,792 P.2d 405 (1990).
2).

Id. at 75,792 P.2d at 407.
='Jew, 11, supra,at 158.
Id.
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preempted.239ERISA does not preempt state laws that regulate insurance.240
Moreover,
state laws which affect ERISA plans in a "tenuous, remote or peripheral" manner will not
be ~reempted.'~'Although ERISA provides no equivalent remedy to bad faith,
preemption does not necessitate dismissal of the action where the pleadings state a cause
of action arising under federal law."2 The Supreme Court has found that ERISA so
completely preempts the field of employee benefit plans that a complaint asserting only
state causes of action may state a claim arising under federal law for the purpose of
finding federal question jurisdiction under ERISA?~' In the Tenth Circuit, "[a] state law
claim will convert to a federal claim [if] the claim is preempted by ERISA and within the
scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions."z44
VII. UNFAIR PRACTICE STATUTES

During the mid 1960s and 1970s, state legislatures began to codify the issues of
good faith and fair dealing by enacting unfair claims practices statutes.245Often times
these statues and the causes of action they create preempt or supplant common law bad
faith action^."^ This has not been the case in New Mexico.

'I9 See e.g. Fort Halifca Packaging Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987)(no preemption where state law insures
administration of a plan governed by a single set of regulations and to guarantee administrative integrity,
issues not addressed under ERISA); Hospice of Metro Denver, Inc. v. Group Health Ins. ofOklahoma, Inc.,
944 F.2d 753,754 (10" Cir. 1991Xstate laws which affect plans in only a "tenuous, remote or peripheral"
manner will not be preempted).
Henderson, supra, at 1173.
u'Hospice of Metro Denver, Inc. v. Group Health Ins. Of Oklahoma Inc., 994 F.2d 752,754 (lo* Cir.
1991).
"'Jerry, 11, supra, at 158.
"'See Metropolitan LifeIns. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58,95 L.Ed 2d 55, 107 S.Ct. 1542 (1987).
Carland v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d I 1 14,lI 19 (10" Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 116 L.Ed. 2d
761, 112 S. Ct. 670 (1991).
'"Richmond, supra, at 1 13.
Id.

In 1967, The New Mexico Legislature enacted a comprehensive Unfair Practices
Act ("UPA), Sections 57-12-1 to 57-12-16.247This act prohibits unconscionable and
unfair or deceptive trade practices. In 1973, the legislature enacted the Unfair Insurance
Practices Act which prohibits certain unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts in the business of insurance. However, this act was repealed in 1984,
following the enactment of a comprehensive Insurance Code?48 The Unfair Insurance
Practices Act had the same purpose as the present New Mexico Insurance Code. Under
the old Act there was no private right of action for unfair insurance practices. However,
the new Code explicitly grants insureds a private right of action for unfair insurance
practicesF9 Claims that form the basis of a suit under either bad faith or unfair insurance
practices include those where: the insurer misrepresents to insured pertinent facts or
policy provisions relating to coverage for the purpose of defeating coverage; the insurer
fails to affirm or deny coverage of claims of insured within a reasonable time; the insurer
fails to settle in good faith.2s0
To state a cause of action under the Unfair Practices Act, the insured must show
that the insurer, while engaged in trade practice, took advantage the insured's lack of
knowledge, ability, experience or capacity to a grossly unfair degree?" Thus, where an
insured asserts an action for the insurer's bad faith under the terms of the insurance
contract, the insured may alternatively seek relief under the Unfair Practices Act. Under

'"NMSA 1978, $5 57-12-1 to 16.
"'NMSA 1978, $§ 59A-1-1 to 59A-53-17.
''9NMSA 1978, $ 59A-16-30. ( "any person covered by this article... a right to bring an action in district
court to recover actual damages.") This code supersedes the old Insurance code which did not provide a
private cause of action. See NMSA 1978 59-1 1-9.
2wAshley,supra, 5-57; NMSA 1978,s 59A-16-1 through 30.

the Unfair Pr9ctices Act, the trial judge may, upon a finding of willful engagement in the
trade practice, treble the actual damages awarded.252However, in the event of a trebling
of damages by the trial judge and a verdict for punitive damages based upon a finding of
bad faith, the insured will then be required to elect between the two awards so not to
duplicate recovery.253
VIII. CONCLUSION
The law of bad faith was judicially created as a way to deal with increased tension
between insurance companies and their insureds. The tort duty of bad faith contemplates
that insurers must deal fairly with insureds and conduct their affairs in good faith. Despite
the widespread acceptance of the law of bad faith, the concept of bad faith remains
somewhat elusive, having no universally accepted definition.
Consequently, courts will continue developing the !aw of bad faith and the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing as standards to test the propriety of insurers'
conduct. In particular, future cases may address the requisite standard of care for bad
faith duty to defend, and decide whether an insurer has a right to argue issues of coverage
once it unjustifiably fails to defend.

'"See Ashlock v. Sunwest Bank of Roswell, N.A. 107 N . M . 100,753 P.2d 346 (1988); NMSA 1978,s 5712-2D.
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